I recently received a compilation of
I just finished Eleonore Stump’s (Philosopher –
“In “Second-person Accounts and the Problem of Evil,” I discussed the problem of evil in a preliminary way. I raised a methodological issue regarding philosophical problems such as the problem of evil, and I argued that at least sometimes an important role in their examination can be played by what I called (adapting a phrase from Avishai Margalit) ‘a second-person account.’ A second-person experience is the sort of experience I have when I have personal interaction of a direct and unmediated kind with another conscious person. A second-person account is a representing of such a second-person experience in a form which helps someone who was not part of that experience to simulate what it would have been like for him if he had been a bystander in it. I went on to argue that the book of Job is a second-person account of Job’s interactions with God, and that God’s speeches to Job are themselves a second-person account of God’s interactions with his creatures. I tried to show that, contrary to common opinion, there is a theodicy in the book of Job but that it is in the form of a second-person account. Such a second-person account will have much more weight with believers than non-believers because, like Job, believers have their own second-person experiences of God, of one sort or another, to draw on. So, I argued in the last lecture, believers and non-believers will and should approach the problem of evil in different ways. Believers should bring to bear on the problem not only the usual array of philosophical and theological considerations but also their own religious experience of God and their interpretations of second-person accounts involving God, especially biblical narratives. To do so is to approach the problem of evil with the stance Job takes towards God at the end of the book.” (Eleonore Stump, “Faith and the Problem of Evil,” in Seeking Understanding: The Stob Lectures (1986-1998), p. 530).
So, what does this have to do with my title? It’s quite simple; philosophers and exegetes (and theologians and psychologists . . .) need to be in conversation with one another. Oftentimes, philosophers engage in sloppy exegesis in their research and writing. Oftentimes, exegetes forget that they bring certain philosophical assumptions to the biblical text, some of which may be philosophically suspect. One thing we all need to keep in mind is the Medieval idea of the unity of all truth, and that all truth is God's truth. Interdisciplinary dialogue is and will be fruitful. What is interesting about Stump’s Stob Lectures is that I think she is adding a necessary and exegetically warranted layer of nuance to the interpretation of the “God speaks” sections in the text of Job. She uses the Anchor Bible Commentary as a foil for her interpretative proposals. I’m neither an exegetical scholar nor an expert on Job, but I think Stump is on to something with her interpretation of Job. All I really want to say, then, is that future commentaries on Job would do well to interact with Stump’s second-person assessment and how this functions as a response to the problem of evil within the framework of scriptural premises. What emerges from this interpretation is different from some of the other extant interpretive proposals (I say this with some measure of caution given that I have not sampled most of the commentaries on Job. I’ll put it in the form of a conditional then—if commentators have not pursued something akin to Stump’s proposal, then they should explore this further).
Far from being a callous, vindictive God who cares not what his creatures of dust suffer, God in the whirlwind, who speaks of even inanimate and non-human sentient creatures that do not share in the imago dei in motherly, tender terms, is intimately interested in his image bearers, so interested that he communes with them, giving them, indeed us, you and me, an encounter with himself. His interaction with Job is a demonstration of his power, to be sure. But this power is balanced by his intricate personal care, a care that is revealed through these second-person accounts. This is no third-person response to the problem of evil, where we come to know why pain, suffering, and evil is the salient feature in some state of affairs x (the concern of traditional treatments of evil), but it is an answer on a different, probably more important level. I look forward to concluding Stump's second installment within the next few days, as it has already proven well worthwhile.